Recent Cases by Costas, G. G.
University of Miami Law School
Institutional Repository
University of Miami Inter-American Law Review
10-1-1975
Recent Cases
G. G. Costas
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umialr
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the International Law Commons
This Special Feature is brought to you for free and open access by Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami
Inter-American Law Review by an authorized administrator of Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.
Recommended Citation
G. G. Costas, Recent Cases, 7 U. Miami Inter-Am. L. Rev. 813 (1975)
Available at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umialr/vol7/iss3/15
RECENT CASES
GREGORY G. COSTAS*
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
Southeastern Leas. Corp. v. Stern Dragger Belogorsk Etc., 493 F.2d
1223 (1st Cir. 1974).
The instant action was dismissed by the U.S. District Court for the
District of Massachusetts on the basis of a suggestion of immunity from
the State Department. The dismissal brought about the release of the
arrested Soviet vessel Belogorsk.
On appeal, appellants maintained that the vessel was neither owned
nor controlled by the Soviet Union and that the court erred by accepting
the suggestion of immunity without conducting an independent judicial
inquiry when faced with such allegations. Alternatively, appellants con-
tended that the U.S.S.R. waived sovereign immunity by agreeing in a
treaty that Soviet vessels would enter U.S. ports subject to the applicable
laws and regulations of the United States.
In addressing itself to the first issue, the court expressed reluctance
to depart from established authority to the effect that the certification
and request that a vessel be declared immune must be accepted by the
courts as a conclusive determination by the political arm of the Govern-
ment that the continued retention of the vessel interferes with the proper
conduct of foreign relations. Furthermore, upon submission of such certi-
fication to the district court, it becomes the court's duty, in conformity
with established principles, to release the vessel and to proceed no further
in the case (citing Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 63 S.Ct. 793, 87 L.Ed.
1014 (1943).). In light of such authority, the appellate court upheld the
District Court's action with respect to the executive suggestion of immun-
ity. The court also rejected appellant's second contention out of hand
and concluded by affirming in entirety the District Court's decision.
*J. D. candidate, University of Miami School of Law.
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JURISDICTION
U.S. v. Fernindez. 496 F.2d 1294 (5th Cir. 1974)
The defendant below was convicted in the U.S. District Court for
the Western District of Texas on six counts of an indictment charging
him with possessing, forging, and uttering three U.S. Treasury checks
allegedly stolen from the U.S. mails. On appeal Fermindez alleged error
as to the trial judge's charge to the jury, prejudicial comments made by
the prosecutor in final argument, and lack of sufficient evidence to sup-
port conviction on three of the counts contained in the indictment. Addi-
tionally, he challenged the jurisdiction of the federal court to hear the
case because the alleged crimes took place outside of the territorial juris-
diction of the U.S. Due to its significant relation to the international
arena, only the court's treatment of the last issue will be covered.
In the court below, appellant made timely motion to dismiss for lack
of jurisdiction. The motion was denied and he raised the question again
on appeal.
The appellate court found that under the theory of objective ter-
ritorial jurisdiction, the trial court had the right to charge and try
Fernandez for the offenses. Looking to Strassheim v. Dailey, the court
offered the following quotation as the point of origin for the objective
territoriality theory:
"Acts done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to produce
and producing detrimental effects within it, justify a state
in punishing the cause of harm as if he had been present
at the effect, if the state should succeed in getting him
within its power." 211 U.S. 280, 285, 31 S.Ct. 558, 560,
55 L.Ed. 735, 738 (1911).
The above theory was found to be readily applicable to the instant
case because the alleged acts of possessing, forging, and uttering the
checks in Mexico were intended to, and did produce, a detrimental effect
within the U.S. Such effect being that -the normal disbursement of Social
Security funds to those lawfully entitled to them was thwarted. Thus,
the jurisdictional issue was resolved favorably for the Government.
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IMMIGRATION
Mufioz--Casarez v. Immigration and Naturalization Service. 511
F.2d 947 (9th Cir. 1975)
Petitioner, an alien and citizen of Mexico, was admitted to the
United States for permanent residence on June 13, 1956. He subsequently
went to Mexico in July, 1969 for a visit of approximately one month's
duration.
On January 26, 1970 he was convicted of voluntary manslaughter
in California. Thereafter on April 18, 1973, an Order to Show Cause
and Notice of Hearing was issued charging that petitioner was subject
to deportation pursuant to See. 241 (a) (4) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1251 (a) (4), which provides for the
deportation upon the order of the Attorney General of an alien convicted
of a crime involving moral turpitude committed within five years after
entry.
The immigration judge held that the petitioner should be deported.
The Board of Immigration Appeals upheld the ruling and petitioner filed
for review.
On appeal, the issue raised was whether Casarez's return to the U.S.
after the 1969 absence constituted an entry under Sec. 241(a) (4).
Section 101(a) (13) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1101 (a) (13) defines
entry as any coming of an alien into the U.S., except that an alien having
a lawful, permanent residence shall not be regarded as making entry if
he can satisfy the Attorney General that his departure was "not intended
or reasonably to be expected by him" or was not voluntary (emphasis
added).
Citing Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449, 83 S.Ct. 1804, 10 L.Ed.
2d 1000 (1963), the court found that the term "intended" refers to "an
intent to depart in a manner which can be regarded as meaningfully
interruptive of the alien's permanent residence." 374 U.S. at 462, 83 S.Ct.
at 1812. Further, the criteria to be considered are length of the absence,
purpose of the visit and whether travel documents are necessary.
The petitioner asserted that he never intended to abandon his resi-
dence in the U.S. The court pointed out however, that it is not abandon-
ment of residence that constitutes a return to the U.S. an "entry." But
rather it is a departure which is "meaningfully interruptive" of residence.
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Thus, on the record of the case, the court upheld the immigration judge
and the Board of Immigration Appeals and found that the petitioner's
return to the U.S. constituted an entry under Sec. 241(a) (4).
EXECUTIVE DISCRETION IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Jensen v. National Marine Fisheries Service (NOAA). 512 F.2d 1189
(9th Cir. 1975).
Bjorn Jensen et al, plaintiffs below, brought action in the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the Western District of Washington, seeking a declaratory
judgment and an injunction against the enforcement of a regulation of
the International Halibut Commission and of the Northern Pacific Halibut
Act of 1937. 16 U.S.C. Sections 772b, 672d and 772e, which provide
criminal penalties for the violation of the Commission's regulations. The
court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction and the plaintiffs
appealed.
The appellants were owners and operators of fishing boats which
ply the Pacific Ocean catching fish with devices known as otter trawls.
The Commission is the progeny of a 1954 treaty between the U.S. and
Canada promulgated for the purpose of preserving the halibut fishery
in the Northern Pacific (5 U.S.T. 5, T.I.A.S. No. 2900). Essentially, the
treaty provides that the Commission will enact regulations for this pur.
pose subject to the approval of the President of the U.S. and the Governor
General of Canada. Presidential approval in the U.S. was delegated to
the Secretary of State by executive order.
Appellants specifically complain of a Commission regulation which
prohibits them from keeping halibut incidentally caught in their nets
while pursuing other species of fish and requires them to return the hali-
but to the sea when they have been so caught.
On appeal, the appellants asserted jurisdiction under the Administra-
tive Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. Sections 702 and 704, and argued that the
Secretary's action in approving the regulation constituted agency action
reviewable by the federal courts. They also argued that the action of
Congress in passing the Northern Pacific Halibut Act was an unconsti-
tutional delegation of legislative power to the President due to an absence
of guidelines concerning the approval of Commission regulations.
The court found, for the purposes of the appeal, that the Secretary's
actions were- those of the President, thereby precluding review under
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the terms of the APA because presidential action in the field of foreign
affairs is committed to presidential discretion by law. Additionally, the
court pointed out that the Supreme Court had held that such decisions
are political in nature and do not present a justiciable case or contro-
versy within the meaning of Article III of the Constitution (Chicago &
Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 103,
68 S.Ct. 431, 92 L.Ed. 568, 1948).
Secondly, the court held again that nonjusticiability served to pre-
vent the district court from assuming jurisdiction of the claim grounded
in the unlawful delegation of Congressional power to the President. This
holding stemmed from the fact that appellants presented only the possi-
bility of being prosecuted for violation of the regulation thus failing again
to establish the existence of a case or controversy.
Lastly, the court stated that notwithstanding the nonjusticiability of
the issue, the delegation of power was not improper because in cases
where legislation is to be made effective through negotiation and inquiry
within the international field, the President must often be given a degree
of discretion and freedom from statutory restriction which would be
improper if purely domestic affairs were involved (citing U.S. v. Curtiss-
Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 57 S.Ct. 216, 81 L.Ed. 255, 1936).
CHOICE OF LAW
Challoner v. Day and Zimmermann, Inc., 512 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1975)
This diversity suit arose as a result of the premature explosion of
a howitzer round manufactured by Day and Zimmermann, defendant
below. The incident occurred in Cambodia while U.S. armed forces were
engaged in combat with the North Vietnamese. One serviceman was
seriously injured and another killed.
Challoner and the administrator of the deceased serviceman's estate,
plaintiffs below, brought suit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Texas. Plaintiffs' suit was grounded upon strict liability prin-
ciples provided by Texas law. Judgment was entered for the plaintiffs
and the defendant appealed.
Concerning international law, the principal issue on appeal was
whether the District Court was correct in applying Texan substantive
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law. Other issues raised dealt with the finer points of strict liability
in Texas, jury instructions, and admissibility of certain U.S. Govern-
ment reports.
The defendant argued that under the Erie-Klaxon doctrine, Texas
choice of law rules should be used which in turn would require the
application of Cambodian law (ostensibly more favorable to manu-
facturers) because Cambodia was the situs of the injury. The court
agreed with the contention as far as it went, but then provided a number
of reasons why it was going to arrive at a contrary holding.
Citing Lester v. Aetna Life Insurance Company, 433 F.2d 884 (5th
Cir. 1970), the court found that Cambodia had no interest or policy at
stake as concerned the litigants in, or the outcome of, the case at bar.
As a result, the court concluded that the application of Texan substantive
law would best serve the interests of the states involved (Wisconsin being
Challoner's domicile, Tennessee being the decedent's domicile, Pennsyl-
vania being the locus of the defendant's principle place of business, and
Texas being the forum state).
In further butressing its holding, the court pointed out that under
established principles of international law Cambodia had no standing
to determine rights or liabilities between foreign subjects arising out of
the military activities of a foreign power because a nation is understood
to cede a portion of her territorial jurisdiction when she allows the
troops of a foreign nation to pass through her dominions (The Schooner
Exchange v. M'Faddon, 7 Cranch 116, 3 L.Ed. 287 (1812).).
Lastly, in view of the court's nature as an instrumentality created
to effectuate the laws and policies of the United States, it took the posi-
tion of being unwarranted, legally or morally, to frustrate well established
American policies (specifically a manufacturer's strict liability) by an
application of the local policies of a foreign government to the case at
bar. Thus, the judgment of the District Court was affirmed.
